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Efforts at fiscal consolidation are often limited because of concerns over potential social unrest. 
From German austerity measures during the 1930s to the violent demonstrations in Greece in 2010, 
hard times have tended to go hand in hand with antigovernment violence. In this paper, I assemble 
cross-country evidence from eleven South American countries for the period 1937 to 1995 about the 
extent to which societies become unstable after budget cuts. The results show a clear positive 
correlation between austerity and instability. I examine the extent to which this relationship simply 
captures the fact that fiscal retrenchment and economic slumps are correlated, and conclude that this 
is not what is driving the effect. Finally, I test for interactions with various economic and political 
variables. While autocracies and democracies show a broadly similar response to budget cuts, 





Los esfuerzos de consolidación fiscal son comúnmente desalentados ante un potencial estallido 
social. Desde la política de austeridad fiscal en Alemania en los años treinta a las violentas protestas 
en Grecia en el 2010, los tiempos difíciles han ido de la mano con la violencia antigubernamental. 
Este artículo recolecta evidencia de once países sudamericanos entre 1937 y 1995 sobre 
inestabilidad social ocurrida después de recortes presupuestarios. Los resultados muestran una clara 
correlación positiva entre austeridad fiscal e inestabilidad. Este artículo examina cuánto de esta 
correlación está determinada por la relación entre ajustes fiscales y recesiones económicas, 
concluyendo que esta relación no es relevante. Finalmente, este artículo comprueba la interacción 
entre diversas variables políticas y económicas. Mientras autocracias y democracias muestran una 
respuesta similar a los ajustes fiscales, hay una menor probabilidad de que ocurra un estallido social 
en países con una historia de instituciones estables como resultado de políticas de austeridad fiscal. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
On May 1, 2010, the Greek Prime Minister George Papandreau announced a 
set of drastic austerity measures. May Day itself saw clashes between police and 
demonstrators. On May 5, a general strike paralysed the country; armed 
demonstrators fought street battles with police. A bank burned down, and numerous 
demonstrators and policemen were injured. By the standards of anti-government 
protests, the May 2010 incidents in Athens were mild. Many countries have seen 
severe rioting and political violence following budget cuts. In this paper, I examine 
the extent to which social unrest is clearly associated with fiscal austerity. Do riots, 
anti-government demonstrations, political assassinations, and attempts at 
revolutionary overthrow become more common if governments push through tax 
hikes and spending cuts?  
 
I analyse this question for South America during the period 1937-1995. The 
continent’s notoriously volatile politics, combined with large swings in fiscal 
conditions, make it a particularly appealing laboratory for exploring the link 
between fiscal adjustment and social instability. From the popular protests that led 
to the fall of the de la Rúa administration in Argentina to the ‘Caracazo’ in 
Venezuela, austerity measures have played a prominent role in numerous cases of 
mass protest (Sonntag, Maingón, and Biardeau, 1992; Handelman and Sanders, 
1981). Cuts in expenditure are particularly strongly correlated with violent forms of 
protest and attempts to overthrow the government. Fiscal adjustment through tax 
increases is less clearly associated with unrest than expenditure cuts. This suggests 
a reason why budget adjustments – even if associated with better macroeconomic 
performance (Alesina and others, 2002) – are not very common in practice.1 The 
relationship between austerity and unrest is apparent in countries with both 
autocratic and democratic regimes – countries do not need a minimum level of 
political development to show a clear-cut correlation between unrest and fiscal 
contractions.  
 
There is also evidence that the relationship between fiscal adjustment and 
antigovernment violence has strengthened in recent decades. Until the mid-1970s, 
the link is weaker in the data than after this date. It seems likely that improving 
institutions, greater freedoms to associate and for the press, and a higher degree of 
democratic participation after the mid-1970s in a number of countries have resulted 
in mass protests becoming another form of ‘bargaining’ with the government.  
 
Related literature includes work on the nature and timing of fiscal 
adjustments, as well as the causes of social unrest. That immiseration is the driving 
force behind violent upheavals is a common theme in the political science literature 
since at least the days of Karl Marx. The Weimar Republic’s demise in the 1930s is 
often cited as a warning. In a bid to gain competitiveness on world markets, the 
German government under Chancellor Brüning cut public expenditure (including 
civil servant pay) and introduced major tax hikes (Bracher, 1978). Street fighting 
between Communists and Nazi Party supporters, riots and political murders 
                                                 
1 Cf. also the recent reassessment in by the IMF (2010).  
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followed, and arguably prepared the ground for Hitler’s Machtergreifung in 1933.2 
More generally, several authors have examined the interplay of fiscal consolidation 
and social unrest in interwar Europe (Eichengreen, 1996; Feldman, 1997; Maier and 
Knapp, 1975; Wirsching, 2003). France in the 1930s in particular is a case of 
political violence increasing in times of fiscal austerity. 
 
This paper also connects with research on the determinants and feasibility of 
fiscal adjustment. Research by Alesina and others (2002) suggests that fiscal 
contractions can be expansionary. Related work by Alesina, Perotti, and Tavares 
(1998) also argues that there is no ‘penalty’ for the government – it neither loses 
popularity, nor are its chances of re-election reduced. Sharp adjustments may even 
be rewarded by the electorate. This is in line with the finding by Kraemer (1997) 
that fiscal expansions in Latin America prior to elections do not increase a 
government’s chances of staying in power.  
 
If we take these findings at face value, they raise the question why fiscal 
adjustments are ever delayed – without a penalty at the ballot box or in the national 
accounts, why aren’t fiscal adjustment implemented instantly and vigorously? The 
findings in the papers by Alesina and others imply that the ‘typical’ cost of 
adjustments may be low, measured in terms of growth or electoral success. At the 
same time, the expenditure cuts of the type favored by Alesina and others (2002) 
sharply raise the risk of major social upheaval – at least in South America during 
the period 1937-95. This is in line with the argument in a classic paper by Alesina 
and Drazen (1991). They argue that stabilizations are often delayed because social 
groups engage in a ‘war of attrition’. For the argument to work, adjustment has to be 
costly, and while it is postponed, parties fight over which group will bear its brunt. 
While Alesina and Drazen do not address unrest and its causes directly, it is 
straightforward to think of street protests and mass violence as part of the 
negotiation process that ultimately decides the shape and size of austerity measures. 
Part of the answer is suggested by studies that examine the relative ‘strength’ of the 
ruling government. Stein, Talvi, and Grisanti (1999) argue that in Latin America, 
more fragmented political systems – as proxied by the size of electoral districts – are 
associated with greater levels of public spending.3 A government’s parliamentary 
backing has a similar effect. Also, Woo (2003) found that instability and unrest are 
clearly associated with higher levels of public debt. This implies that countries with 
more debt are either less stable politically, or that instability makes it harder to 
achieve budget discipline. Neto and Borsani (2004) find that government stability is 
associated with greater fiscal prudence, as are the level of parliamentary support 
and a conservative orientation of the ruling party.  
 
The study closest in spirit to ours is Paldam (1995). He studies 9 balance of 
payments crises in 7 South American countries. Most of these were associated with 
attempts to lower inflation. Governments (sometimes with IMF help) pushed 
through spending cuts, and saw a rise in protests in response. Paldam uses an 
                                                 
2 The extent to which economic factors drove voters into the arms of the Nazi Party is 
controversial (Falter, 1991; King and others, 2008).  
3 There is also evidence that countries with ‘presidential’ systems have smaller governments 
(Persson and Tabellini, 2005).  
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event-study methodology, and compares the 26 weeks before the announcement of 
budget adjustments with the 55 weeks thereafter. His outcome variables include 
strikes, protest demonstrations, and changes in government composition (or regime 
change). Surprisingly, Paldam finds that protests decline after adjustment measures 
are introduced (before returning to pre-adjustment levels later). At the same time, 
there is a spike in government changes some 10 weeks after new budget measures 
are brought in. Paldam also argues that democratic regimes experience more violent 
protests than autocracies. For Africa, Morrison, Lafay, and Dessus (1994) analyse 
IMF interventions and fiscal adjustments. They find that economic stabilization 
programmes can be politically risky. Within six months of an adjustment 
programme, strike activity increases.4 The study finds that increases in relative 
prices – through new taxes, the end of food subsidies, devaluations, and public tariff 
changes – are likely to raise the level of political agitation. On the other hand, 
expenditure cuts – especially those for public investment – have no discernible 
effect. Another study by the OECD examined the effects of aid and monetary 
adjustments on strikes and demonstrations (Haggard, Lafay, and Morrisson, 1995). 
It finds that increases in aid reduce unrest, and that IMF and monetary tightening 
increase it. 
 
Other related literature also includes work on the interaction between 
distributional outcomes, political change, and the potential for political violence. 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) argue that the ‘West’ extended the franchise to heed 
off the threat of revolution. Boix (2003) builds a more general model in which 
inequality and asset specificity modifies the trade-off between opting for violence or 
accepting the status quo. In either case, if the threat of violent overthrow is credible, 
it seems plausible that various forms of violent mass-protests can be used as a form 
of collective bargaining over distributional outcomes.  
 
In the social psychology literature, the importance of comparison effects and 
of low social distance between favoured and unfavoured groups has generally been 
emphasized (Berkowitz, 1972). Other papers analyse the importance of peer effects 
in overcoming participation thresholds (Cole, 1969). This suggests that the larger 
the network of potential protesters, the more probable it is that they participate in 
mass actions.   
 
I proceed as follows. Section 2 summarizes our data, and section 3 presents 
the main results. The following section examines the robustness of these findings, 
and section 5 concludes.  
 
 
                                                 
4 It should be noted that the estimated coefficients are small (around 0.15, and the authors 
do not test for significance).   
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2.  DATA AND CONTEXT 
Neither quantifying violent protests nor the measurement of fiscal 
adjustments are simple tasks.5 In this paper, I use data collected by Banks (1994) on 
the number of political assassinations, general strikes, riots, and anti-government 
demonstrations. While the dataset was compiled from the 1960s onwards as part of a 
large-scale data collection effort at the University of Binghamton, it covers earlier 
periods based on contemporary publications. It is based on information on political 
and economic conditions originally published in The Statesman’s Yearbook. The 
Yearbook was first published in 1863, following suggestions by Prime Ministers 
Robert Peel and William Gladstone, and was meant to contain ‘A Statistical, 
Genealogical, and Historical Account of the States and Sovereigns of the Civilised 
World’. Conflict data itself was gleaned from the New York Times, and is available 
from 1919 onwards. I also use data on economic variables from the Banks (Cross 
National Time Series) dataset, based on data from the UN Statistical Yearbook, and 
Pick's Currency Yearbook. Finally, data on institutional quality comes from the 
Polity IV dataset (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr, 2010).  
 
I use data for 11 South American countries – Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Not 
included are Guyana and French Guyana, the former because data on control 
variables was not available, the latter because it is an overseas territory of France. 
As such, it is not subject to the same political dynamics. The starting date in the 
1930s is the earliest from which we have data on unrest and output per capita for a 
reasonable number of countries. 
 
On average, for each country during a 10 year period, there were 6.9 riots, 6 
anti-government demonstrations, 4 assassinations, and 3.4 attempts to overthrow 
the government in violent fashion (“revolutions”) in our data. The probability of 
unrest did not remain constant over time. I plot the patterns in figures 1 and 2. The 
most striking feature of each time series is its volatility – the number of riots or 
assassinations may be low for several years, before suddenly reaching a very high 
level in a single year. Riots were more common in South America in the 1950s and 
1960s than in later years. While the average frequency in ‘normal’ years has not 
changed much from the 5-8 recorded in the immediate post-war era, there are fewer 
peaks. In the period 1937-1970, there were 9 years with more than 10 riots in the 
sample; after 1970, there was only one. 
 
Politically motivated assassinations show the opposite pattern. There were 
relatively few in the immediate post-war period. Typical years show zero or one 
murder of a politician, and bad years, two to three. After the mid-1970s, this 
changed dramatically. Even ‘quiet’ years now register 3-5 assassinations, and there 





                                                 
5 For methodological considerations, cf. IMF (2010).  
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The history of anti-government demonstrations and of coups and revolutions 
– attempted or successful – is similarly volatile. Figure 2 gives an overview. Anti-
government demonstrations have been on an increasing trend since the 1930s. For 
most of the 1950s and 1960s, there were 3-5 of them per year, with values above 5 a 
rare occurrence. Since 1970, there have been more than 10 years with more than ten 
anti-government demonstrations, with an all-time peak of 25 in 1984. 
 








































Attempts at revolution have been on a declining trend. The immediate post-
war era saw a high number, with 12 recorded attempts at overthrowing the existing 
government in 1948. The 1950s and 1960s also continued to be marked by violent 
attempts at overturning the established order, with revolutionary episodes in the 
early 1960s and early 1970s. Since the mid-70s, revolutions have become rare, with 
no years registering a frequency higher than 5.  
 
The Banks dataset contains an aggregate measure of unrest – the “weighted 
conflict index” (henceforth, wci). It combines the different series on unrest in the  
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Banks dataset by adding them up with different weights. Assassinations, for 
example, receive a weight of 24, while purges count almost four times as much (86). 
Anti-government demonstrations receive the highest score (200). The weights were 
not chosen based on statistical analysis; they reflect the assessment of Banks and 
his team. In subsequent analysis, this indicator is used. 
 
In addition, I construct an aggregate measure based on principal components 
analysis, using a subset of the time series collected by Banks. Arguably, of the eight 
indicators compiled in the Banks database, only five are closely related to the issue 
that we are interested in – social unrest that can reflect opposition to or protests 
against government spending cuts. These variables are anti-government 
demonstrations, general strikes, riots, assassinations, and revolutions. In contrast, 
purges are attempts by the authorities to silence the opposition. Government crises 
may have many origins, and rarely reflect public unrest as a result of fiscal 
adjustments.6 Finally, acts of guerrilla warfare often reflect long-running military 
conflict between different ethnic groups, or attempts by foreign powers to undermine 
the government. While some degree of popular support is clearly necessary for the 
guerrilleros to succeed, it is not clear that the frequency of guerrilla warfare maps 
closely into levels of popular support, at least at annual frequency.  In addition, it is 
unlikely that fiscal adjustments in a single year can lead to sufficient 
disillusionment for such a radical course of action.  
 
I use principal component analysis to extract a common factor to the unrest 
captured by the five variables of interest – anti-government demonstrations, general 
strikes, riots, assassinations, and revolutions. The first principal component explains 
38% of the total variance. All factors enter with a positive loading. Riots, 
assassinations, and general strikes have relative high scoring coefficients. The first 
principal component (henceforth, chaos) and the weighted conflict score from the 
Banks dataset (wci) are highly but not perfectly correlated – 0.6, significant at the 
1% level.  
 
Figure 3 compares the two aggregate measures of unrest – wci and chaos. 
While they are positively correlated, it is clear that they do not capture exactly the 
same variation in the data. For example, Brazil in 1969 registers a wci score of over 
27,000, while only showing a chaos indicator of 0.875. This is because a wave of 
guerrilla attacks and purges swept the country in 1969 – Banks registers 14 










                                                 
6 There are clearly exceptions to this, such as Argentina in 2001.  
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Case Studies: Brazil, Chile, and Peru 
Brazil 
During our sample period, Brazil experienced numerous acts of politically-
inspired violence. The 1920s saw several attempts by junior officers to usurp power. 
In 1930, Getúlio Vargas seized power and established a dictatorship. Following an 
attempted Communist uprising in 1935, the dictatorship became more autocratic. 
After Allied victory in 1945, Brazil returned to democracy after a military coup. A 
sequence of populist governments held power until the 1960s, when another military 
coup ushered in a 21-year-long military dictatorship. Civilians have governed since 
1985, and all change of office has been peaceful since (Levine, 2003).  
 
The conflict series for Brazil is dominated by riots, which occurred with some 
frequency in the 1950 and 1960s. The years of military dictatorship show relatively 
fewer incidents overall, and in particular, no attempts at revolutionary overthrow. 
General strikes are also conspicuously rare during the years 1964-75. Increasing 
austerity measures after 1975 are known to have been one factor behind the rise in 
militancy (Frieden, 1992). The strikes of the late 1970s have been widely noted for 
their strength and effectiveness, and were instrumental in bringing military rule to 
an end (Antunes and Wilson, 1994; Payne, 1991). The return to democracy saw a rise 
in protests, including several assassinations in the early 1990s.  
 
To what extent can the ebb and flow of political violence and social unrest in 
Brazil be explained by economic conditions – and in particular, government 
spending? Historians of labor unrest in Brazil have sometimes disputed the role of 
economic factors (Sandoval, 1993). Undoubtedly, each incident in the dataset has 
highly specific causes – accidents of timing, of the political constellation, etc. play a 
role. And yet, I find a negative correlation between expenditure changes and the 
aggregate measure of unrest constructed before (chaos). For the sample as a whole, 
the coefficient is –0.17; for the period before 1965, it is –0.35. Based on the evidence  
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presented so far, there is some reason to suggest that changes in national 
expenditure have had predictive power for the level of unrest documented for Brazil.  
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Chile 
Chile’s political history was generally less volatile than that of many other Latin 
American countries. This changed in the 1920s, when Marxist groups gained in 
influence. A military coup in 1925 ushered in a period of rapid turnover in 
governments, which lasted until constitutional rule was restored in 1932. The 
following twenty years saw a variety of coalition governments, many dominated by 
the ‘radical’ party (Collier and Sater, 2004). Under Jorge Alessandri, elected in 1958, 
the conservatives gained power once more. From 1964 onwards, a left-leaning 
government under Eduardo Frei pursued a series of reforms. These included 




Our data shows only a handful of strikes and riots in Chile in the 1950s and 
early 1960s. Under the Frei government, unrest increased, with left-wing militants 
strengthened their position. After the 1970 election, Salvador Allende became 
President. As well as embarking on a major program of social reform, the state’s role 
in the economy grew. The banking system was nationalized. The Allende years show 
a rise in the frequency of riots, attempted overthrows of the government, and anti-
government demonstrations. At the same time, government spending increased 
massively, with particular emphasis on social programs (Collier and Sater, 2004). 
Unrest peaked in the years prior to the military putsch that overthrew the Allende 
government and brought General Pinochet to power.  
 
Military dictatorship went hand-in-hand with relatively few incidents in the 
Banks dataseries (murders of dissidents and activists are not counted). The next 
wave of unrest arrived between the referenda of 1980 and 1988 that ushered in the 
end of the Pinochet regime. The year 1983 saw the founding of the Manuel 
Rodríguez Patriotic Front (MRPF), which attempted to organize armed resistance 
against the Pinochet regime (Ensalaco, 2000). During the period, riots and 
demonstrations were commonplace, with 15 anti-government demonstrations in 
1985 alone. The years after the return to democracy in 1991 then saw a low level of 
violence, only interrupted by a spike in political assassinations in 1991 itself 
(including the murder of Senator Jaime Guzmán, a former confidante of General 
Pinochet, by the MRPF).  
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The link between fiscal austerity and instability is not readily apparent in the 
case of Chile (see Figure 7). Sharp declines in central government spending did not 
coincide with the peaks in unrest; periods of normal increases in expenditure 
coincide with major upheaval. While much of the historical literature on Chile has 
stressed the extent to which worker militancy was fuelled by economic concerns, 
there is no clear evidence in favour of a direct, strong link between budget cuts and 
unrest (the correlation coefficient is negative – 0.07 – but insignificant).7  
 
                                                 
7 Salazar (2006).  
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Peru 
Peru’s history since the 1930s is marked by frequent alterations between 
civilian and military rule. Levels of violence were heightened by the presence of 
guerrilla movements, some of them with strong links to the drugs trade. From its 
founding in the 1930s, the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) 
militated in favour of social reform and an internationalist agenda (Thorp and 
Bertram, 1978). One of its main competitors was the Communist Party of Peru. 
APRA candidates after World War II won elections, but military intervention 
stopped them from taking office. From the 1960s onwards, Communist guerrilla 
movements caused increasing levels of violence. The years 1968-80 saw another 
period of military government. APRA returned to power when Alan García became 
president in 1985. A period of hyperinflation and increasing civil war against the 
Shining Path guerrilla followed. The administration of Alberto Fujimori elected in 
1990, brought inflation under control. It also dissolved Congress against the 
constitutional rules, and pushed through major reforms. A crackdown on the Shining 
Path insurgency was largely successful, but resulted in several massacres.  
 
During its post-war history, Peru experienced two major waves of social 
unrest according to our measure. Figure 8 plots developments over time. The mid-to-
late seventies, as the rule of the military was coming to an end, saw a surge in riots 
and demonstrations; the late 1980s witnessed numerous political murders. Even at 
its peak, the overall level of unrest was low compared to, say, Chile. Upheavals in 
the late 1970s were associated with a debt crisis and a need to refinance external 
borrowing. IMF support came in exchange for austerity measures. The 1977 
agreement on debt refinancing resulted in large price increases for food and 
gasoline, which promptly provoked large-scale demonstrations (Handelman and 
Sanders, 1981).8 Paldam (1995) also classifies 1982 and 1990 as years of economic 
crisis, with inflation high and terrorism widespread. In 1989, several thousand 
                                                 
8 There is some evidence that the unrest of the summer of 1977 led directly to the transition 
to democracy, as President Morales decided to stave off the prospect of further unrest by 
announcing a timetable for restoring constitutional rule.   
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Peruvians crossed the border into Chile to buy bread, which had become largely 
unavailable in Peru.  
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Figure 9 plots changes in expenditure and our preferred measure of unrest 
side-by-side. There is also some evidence for an inverse movement of the two series 
in the late 1960s. In the main, there is little inverse movement for small changes in 
expenditure. Large fiscal adjustments, on the other hand (such as in the late 1970s) 
coincided with major increases in unrest. After the overthrow of General Velasco, 
many of his economic policies were reversed. The fishing industry, newspaper and 
other firms were denationalized. The government under General Morales Bermúdez 
also returned government to civilian control, and brought in budget measures to 
reduce borrowing (Alexander and Parker, 2007). Overall, the correlation coefficient 
of –0.3 (significant at the 4% level) suggests that budget cuts increased labor unrest 
and anti-government protests.  
 












































1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
year...




3.  MAIN RESULTS 
To what extent do budget cuts go hand-in-hand with surging social unrest? 
This section tests the relationship rigorously. I find strong evidence that fiscal 
austerity is associated with periods of violent protest – the larger the fiscal 
adjustment, the greater the risk of riots, demonstrations, assassinations, and 
revolutions. On the other hand, for general strikes, the patterns I find are weaker. 
There is also reason to believe that the fiscal adjustments most likely to lead to 
social unrest are the ones not driven by poor growth – changes in policy stance, not 
bad times, are most likely to create instability and chaos.  
 
Figure 3 plots the basic relationship. On the y-axis is the first principal 
component of anti-government demonstrations, general strikes, riots, assassinations, 
and revolutions (chaos); on the x-axis, the change in government expenditure 
relative to GDP. The regression does not control for fixed effects or other factors, 
such as GDP growth.  
 
Social unrest varies hugely across time and space. As figure 3 demonstrates, 
there is a higher chance of major unrest if expenditure cuts are severe. Periods of 
spending increases, on the other hand, are typically associated with fewer anti-
government demonstrations, strikes, assassinations, riots, and revolutions. The 
message from the simple analysis in figure 3, then, is that ‘social peace can be 
bought’ – government spending is a useful tool in restraining the militancy of the 
opposition and the extent to which opposition forces can receive mass backing for 
violent action.  
 


















 f1  Fitted values







Next, I examine the relationship between adjustments and unrest 
econometrically. In particular, I estimate fixed effect panel regressions of the type: 
  
  13
  1 ln( ) ( / ) , it i it it it UE x p Y X         (1) 
 
where U is one of the measures of instability in our dataset, (Exp/Y) is the change 
in central government expenditure relative to GDP, and X is a vector of control 
variables. The fixed effect coefficients i are designed to capture the combined effect 
of two factors. First, the Banks dataset relies on newspaper reporting of unrest. The 
level of news coverage may well have a country-specific component, with the same 
disturbance in a larger country being more likely to be reported. Second, countries 
may differ in the level of unrest that should be expected in an average year, 
reflecting factors such as ethnic heterogeneity, the level of legitimate political 
participation, and the acceptability of violence more generally. 
 
As a first pass, the dependent variables used are the two composite measures 
of unrest – chaos and wci. Table 1 gives the results for chaos. Column (1) 
demonstrates that there is a statistically significant effect of expenditure changes 
(relative to GDP) on the level of unrest. An expenditure cut of 3.65 percent of GDP – 
equivalent to a one standard deviation change – would increase unrest by 0.2, or 
roughly 15% of a standard deviation of chaos. The effect is large – expenditure cuts 
by one standard deviation will raise expected levels of unrest (chaos) from the 
average in Brazil (2.1) to the average for Bolivia (2.3). Economic growth also cuts the 
level of unrest, and the effect is significant at the 95% level. When growth declines 
by a full standard deviation, unrest rises by 0.12 points, or half the distance between 
Brazil and Bolivia.  
 
Increases of revenue have an effect that is similar to expenditure changes. At 
first glance, this may appear paradoxical – there is no evidence that higher taxes 
(such as in the case of Greece) lead to more unrest. Since much spending is 
redistributive – and arguably was so in South America for much of its postwar 
history – the negative coefficient on Δ(Revenue/Y) may simply pick up episodes of 
simultaneous tax and spending increases reducing the level of unrest.9 Increasing 
budget deficits are also a good way to prevent violent protests – the coefficient on the 
change in the budget balance is positive (Δ(BudgetB/Y)), indicating a decline in 
unrest when the budget sinks more into the red. While regressions (1) and (3) can 
claim some success in identifying a link between unrest and austerity, the low R2 
clearly cautions against overinterpreting the results – many other factors unrelated 
to budget measures are clearly involved in creating civil unrest and violent conflict 
in a society. 
 
In columns (4) and (5), I subdivide the sample based on a country’s Polity-IV-
score. This is because some authors have found that unrest is less common in 
autocracies (Paldam, 1995). Roughly a quarter of the country-year observations have 
scores below –5, indicating a highly authoritarian regime. In both sub-samples, 
expenditure cuts are associated with more unrest. The coefficient is somewhat 
smaller in the group of countries with more open institutions, but both coefficients 
                                                 
9 If I estimate with expenditure and revenue jointly, there is a small, insignificant, and 
positive coefficient for revenue.  
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are significant at conventional levels. Also, one cannot reject the null that the size of 
the coefficients is the same. 
 
Table 1. Unrest and its Determinants (dependent variable: chaos) (+). 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Sample  All All All  Polity2  <  –5  Polity2  ≥ –5 
(Exp/Y)  –0.057***    –0.091** –0.059*** 
  (–3.21)    (–2.30)  (–3.09) 
       
(logY)  –0.012** –0.012** –0.009* –0.040*** 0.005 
  (–2.22) (–2.13) (–1.76) (–3.50)  (0.87) 
       
(Revenue/Y)   –0.036*     
   (–1.92)      
       
(BudgetB/Y)     0.052**    
     (2.01)    
       
Constant  0.231*** 0.233*** 0.218*** 0.655*** 0.068 
  (3.36) (3.36) (3.15) (3.89) (0.96) 
No.  Observ.  473 473 473 123 323 
R2  0.029 0.015 0.016 0.115 0.033 
(+) All regressions were run with fixed country effects. t statistics in parentheses. (*) p < 0.10, 
(**) p < 0.05, (***) p < 0.01. 
 
I find broadly similar results when using wci, the weighted conflict index, as 
the dependent variable (see Table 2). Column (1) suggests a clear negative impact of 
changes in expenditure relative to GDP (Δ(Exp/Y)). wci varies from 0 to 27,312, with 
a standard deviation of 2,504. The standard deviation of expenditure changes 
relative to GDP is 3.65. The estimated coefficient then implies that a one standard 
deviation cut in expenditure increases unrest by 226, or about 10% of a standard 
deviation of the dependent variable. The coefficient is significant at the 10% level. 
GDP growth also cuts unrest, but the effect is not significant. Here, a one standard 
devation change induces a change of 295 units in the wci, slightly larger than the 
effect of expenditure cuts. The overall R2 shows that neither expenditure changes 
nor economic growth can explain a high share of the total variation in unrest in our 
sample. 
 
Revenue changes have no clear impact on unrest in column (2). The 
estimated coefficient is negative, but not significant at conventional levels. In 
column (3), changes in the government budget balance are positively associated with 




Table 2. Unrest and its Determinants (dependent variable: wci) (+). 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Sample  All  All  All  Polity4 < –5  Polity4 ≥ –5 
(Exp/Y)  –63.74*    –42.60  –83.48** 
  (–1.76)    (–0.48)  (–2.52) 
       
(logY)  –14.33 –14.49 –11.78  –8.54 –20.08* 
  (–1.29) (–1.30) (–1.07) (–0.33) (–1.91) 
       
(Revenue/Y)    –52.94     
    (–1.37)     
       
(BudgetB/Y)     36.20    
     (0.69)    
       
Constant  1,986.7*** 1,991.5*** 1,974.7*** 2,229.2*** 1,792.2*** 
  (14.11) (14.11) (13.98)  (5.84)  (14.38) 
No.  Observ.  473 473 473 123 323 
R2  0.01  0.007 0.004 0.002 0.030 
(+) All regressions were run with fixed country effects. t statistics in parentheses. (*) p < 0.10, 
(**) p < 0.05, (***) p < 0.01. 
 
Columns (4) and (5) estimate the effect of budget cuts for two groups of 
countries – those with high Polity-IV-scores, and those with relatively low ones. For 
the part of the sample with low scores, there is some evidence that expenditure cuts 
lead to unrest, but the effect is not significant (and the coefficient smaller than in 
column 1). Countries with higher scores for the level of openness and democracy, on 
the other hand, also show a much clearer association of expenditure cuts with 
violent protests.  
Different forms of instability 
Next, I examine the individual components of the composite conflict 
indicators summarized above. For four of the five variables in the dataset (used for 
constructing  chaos), there are negative and significant coefficients on the 
expenditure variable, indicating that increases in government spending are 
associated with lower levels of unrest. The coefficients for assassinations and 
demonstrations are significant at the 99% and 95% levels, respectively; those on 
riots and revolutions at the 90% level. General strikes, on the other hand, show a 
positive (if insignificant) coefficient. Growth cuts unrest for all variables except 




Table 3. Different Measures of Instability and Expenditure Cuts (+). 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  Assassinations  General 
Strikes  Riots Revolutions  Demonstrations 
(Exp/Y)  –0.0575*** 0.0095  –0.0309* –0.0146* –0.0413** 
  (–3.30) (0.69)  (–1.66)  (–1.67)  (–2.29) 
          
(logY)  –0.0006 0.0011  –0.0169*** –0.0052* –0.0095* 
  (–0.12) (0.27)  (–2.96)  (–1.93)  (–1.72) 
          
Constant  0.388*** 0.461*** 0.782*** 0.357*** 0.671*** 
  (5.71) (8.61)  (10.77)  (10.48)  (9.55) 
No. Observ.  473  473  473  473  473 
R2 0.023  0.001  0.022  0.013  0.016 
(+) All regressions were run with fixed country effects. t statistics in parentheses. (*) p < 0.10, 
(**) p < 0.05, (***) p < 0.01. 
Inflation and deflation 
Next, I examine the effect of inflation and deflation. It will be useful to know 
if the patterns ascertained are stable independent of the monetary environment. In 
column (1) of Table 3, I use all observations in the sample, but add a control for the 
rate of exchange rate decline (where positive values indicate depreciation of a 
country’s currency). The dependent variable is chaos, as before. Controlling for 
inflationary developments in this way does not change our results. Both the 
coefficient size and its statistical significance are not affected in a major way. When 
the sample is restriced to the 61 country-year observations when inflation was high, 
there is a strong and highly significant effect of expenditure on social instability. The 
coefficient is more than three times larger than in the sample as a whole, and it is 
more statistically significant.  
 
A large literature has stressed that inflationary periods are often driven by 
weak governments trying to satisfy the competing claims of different groups in 
society; using the printing press in such an environment is easier than hiking taxes 
(Feldman, 1997). Stabilizing after periods of high inflation often requires massive 
increases in the primary surplus (Fischer, Sahay, and Vegh 2002). If distributional 
struggles are particularly severe during inflationary periods, it makes sense that 
expenditure cuts are fiercely resisted – as reflected by the steep increase in social 
unrest. For the sample of inflationary episodes, a large share of the total variation in 
unrest can be explained by expenditure and output changes – the R2 rises to over 
0.2, instead of the 0.02-0.03 in other specifications.    
 
In contrast, deflationary periods show no direct effect show no inverse 
relationship between expenditure changes and politically-motivated violence. The 
coefficient in column (3) is positive, and is not statistically different from zero. Since 
the number of observations for deflationary episodes is small, I also bootstrap the 
standard errors in column (3). While not all the standard errors are of similar size, 
the conclusion is not materially affected – there is no clear link between expenditure 
cuts and unrest during periods of deflation. 
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Table 4. Expenditure Cuts and Unrest – Inflationary and Deflationary Periods (+). 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 







(Exp/Y)  –0.0516*** –0.1850*** 0.0934  –0.0295 
  (–2.85) (–3.42)  (0.89)  (–1.50) 
     [0.584]   
(logY)  –0.0142** –0.0028  –0.0007 –0.0220*** 
  (–2.53) (–0.24) (–0.66) (–3.31) 
     [–0.356]   
ExchangeR  0.0677      
  (1.38)      
      
Constant  0.259*** 0.330* 0.136  0.251*** 
  (3.66) (1.77) (0.43) 
[0.41]  (3.18) 
No. Observ.  456  61  26  386 
R2 0.037  0.207  0.063  0.033 
(+) All regressions were run with fixed country effects. t statistics in parentheses; 
bootstrapped standard errors in square brackets. (*) p < 0.10, (**) p < 0.05, (***) p < 0.01. (a) 
defined as a rate of exchange rate decline vis-à-vis the dollar in the top 5% of the sample, i.e. 
above 66% p.a. (b) defined as an absolute increase in the exchange rate vis-à-vis the dollar. 
 
When excluding both inflationary and deflationary periods (eq. 4), I find a 
negative but insignificant coefficient. One cannot reject that the coefficient is the 
same as in the sample as a whole; lack of identifying variance probably limits the 
extent to which one can document a connection between austerity measures and 
budget cuts, but it would be a mistake to claim that the difference between the 
insignificant coefficient in column (4) and the significant one in column (1) is itself 
significant.10 
4.  ROBUSTNESS AND EXTENSIONS 
In this section, I examine the robustness of the main finding so far – a strong, 
significant link between budget cuts and civil unrest. A potentially important issue 
is omitted variable bias. While the issue cannot be resolved definitively in the 
absence of a convincing instrument, it seems likely that this is not a major obstacle. 
Another obvious concern relates to the stability of the link over time. Finally, I test 
for nonlinearities in the data, and examine the robustness of the main finding using 
extreme bounds analysis. 
Omitted variable bias 
The main concern with the equations estimated so far is not reverse causality 
– few governments would implement budget cuts as a consequence of social unrest. 
What is of greater concern is potential omitted variable bias. If, for example,   
economic ‘hard times’ produce a large increase in unemployment, a fall in 
government revenue, and budget cuts, an upsurge of violent protests may be less 
inspired by changes in government spending itself. Instead, they may reflect rising 
                                                 
10 Gelman and Stern (2006).  
  18
immiseration of the population due to an economic crisis at large. This is of 
particular concern since fiscal policy is widely believed to be highly pro-cylical in 
emerging markets.11 
 
In the absence of a compelling instrument, one cannot test isolate the exact 
factor driving the rise in instability. The fact that budget cuts remain highly 
significant even when controlling for economic growth suggests that the omitted 
variable problem cannot be too severe. Adding the square of GDP growth to control 
for non-linearities also does not change the result – both wci and chaos remain 
highly significant and negative, and the size of the coefficient is unaffected.  
Stability over time 
The assumptions underlying regressions of the type estimated in this paper 
are heroic. We have to believe that anti-government demonstrations in Argentina 
under Peron have the same meaning as those against President Alfonsin; a political 
murder of a government official in Chile carries the same information about social 
unrest as in Brazil.  
 
In Table 5, I subdivide the sample in the year 1975 to examine the robustness 
of our findings. There is no significant association between expenditure changes and 
unrest in the aggregate. While revolutions are clearly associated with budget cuts, 
general strikes follow the opposite pattern, in a highly significant manner. Most 
other variables, while showing a negative coefficient, are not statistically significant.  
 
The period after 1975 shows a much clearer association between budget cuts 
and unrest. General strikes now also negatively associated with fiscal expenditures, 
in contrast to the pattern observed in the earlier period. The coefficients for most 
variables are substantially larger, and highly significant. The only exception is 
revolutions, which after 1974 become less responsive to economic conditions. This 
may suggest that discontent before 1975 was more likely to spill over into rebellions, 
possibly in the form of Communist-backed insurgencies. With the decline of Soviet 
and Cuban influence, combined with rising democratization in many South 
American countries, discontented groups in society found other ways of expressing 
themselves.  
 
                                                 
11 Talvi and Vegh (2005); Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008). For a sceptical view, cf. Jaimovich and 
Panizza (2006).  
  19
Table 5. Observations Before and After 1975 (+). 
Panel A  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Before 1975  chaos  Assassinations 
General 
Strikes 
Riots Revolutions  Demonstrations 
(Exp/Y)  –0.0088 –0.0065  0.0374* –0.0153  –0.0348** –0.0131 
  (–0.40) (–0.72)  (1.92)  (–0.50) (–2.52)  (–0.81) 
            




  (–1.79) (1.09)  (–0.40)  (–2.62) (–1.38)  (–0.75) 
            
Constant  0.103 0.123*** 0.343*** 1.170*** 0.483*** 0.401*** 
 (1.03)  (2.95)  (3.81)  (8.23) (7.55)  (5.37) 
No. Observ.  262  262  262  262  262  262 
R2 0.013  0.007  0.015  0.028  0.032  0.005 
            
Panel B  (7) (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
After 1974  chaos  Assassinations 
General 
Strikes 
Riots Revolutions  Demonstrations 
(Exp/Y)  –0.104*** –0.104*** –0.025  –0.043** 0.007  –0.071** 
  (–3.76) (–3.08)  (–1.33)  (–2.30) (0.73)  (–2.11) 
            
(logY)  –0.016** –0.008  0.002  –0.012*** –0.003* –0.015* 
  (–2.41) (–1.02)  (0.40)  (–2.70) (–1.83)  (–1.92) 
            
Constant  0.485*** 0.724*** 0.646*** 0.472*** 0.230*** 1.022*** 
  (4.63) (5.63)  (9.27)  (6.68) (6.57)  (8.07) 
No. Observ.  211  211  211  211  211  211 
R2 0.081  0.047  0.011  0.051  0.022  0.034 
(+) All regressions were run with fixed country effects. t statistics in parentheses. (*) p < 0.10, 
(**) p < 0.05, (***) p < 0.01. 
Regime durability  
Table 1 and Table 2 offered some support for the idea that the effect of fiscal 
adjustments on unrest does not depend on the level of political development. The 
evidence suggested that countries with high or low Polity-IV-scores showed very 
similar coefficients for expenditure changes. Polity-IV-scores range from –10 to 10, 
and are calculated as the difference between the democracy and the autocracy scores 
of a country. These aggregate numerous variables, including the competitiveness 
and openness of executive recruitment, constraints on the executive, the regulation 
of participation, as well as the competitiveness of participation (Marshall, Jaggers, 
and Gurr, 2010).  
 
Another variable that is popular in the political economy literature is 
constraints on the executive (Acemoglu, 2005). While a factor in the Polity scoring 
system, it is arguably of great importance for economic politicial transitions – it 
captures the extent to which ‘might makes right’. Regimes with low constraints on 
the executive may require mass protests and the like to influence policy. Regime 
durability is a separate dimension of a country’s political setup. It counts the 
number of years since a three-point change on the Polity-IV scale. Countries with a 
high value show substantial stability of the political system.  
 
Table 6 gives the results for sub-dividing our sample at the median of the  
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distribution for both constraints on the executive and for durability. For both high 
and low values, there are significant effects of budget adjustments. For relatively 
unconstrained countries, the effect is larger, and growth matters; for countries with 
strong checks and balances, there is a clear effect of budget adjustments, but none of 
economic growth. 
 
Table 6. Fiscal Adjustment and Unrest - Low and High Constraints on the Executive/Long-
Short Durability (+). 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Constraints on the executive  Durability 
  3  3  6  6 
(Exp/Y)  –0.0932** –0.0605*** –0.0639*** –0.0225 
  (–2.52) (–3.21) (–2.64) (–0.87) 
      
(logY)  –0.0384*** 0.0009  –0.0093 –0.0126* 
  (–3.46) (0.15) (–1.03)  (–1.87) 
      
Constant  0.528*** 0.123* 0.216** 0.241** 
  (3.58) (1.71) (2.14) (2.59) 
No. Observ.  157  316  230  243 
R2  0.089 0.033 0.033 0.017 
(+) t statistics in parentheses. (*) p < 0.10, (**) p < 0.05, (***) p < 0.01. 
 
Durability shows a different pattern. Where durability is low – less than six 
years have passed since the last major regime change – the effect of fiscal 
adjustment is strong. Where a country’s political order has seen few changes for an 
extended period, the effect is weaker and not tightly estimated.12 Growth seems to 
matter more for cutting violence in more ‘durable’ regimes, but the two coefficients 
are not different from each other.  
Censored data 
The data on instability is derived from counting events – the number of 
strikes, demonstrations, etc. This means that the main indicators, as well as wci, is 
truncated at zero. It is not clear that the panel versions of the linear probability 
model used so far capture the data adequately. To deal with the issue, I estimate 
panel poisson regressions that take the censoring implicit in the use of non-negative 










                                                 
12 It should be noted that the standard error in equation (4) is so large that the coefficient on 
(Exp/Y) is not significantly different from the one in equation (3).  
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Table 7. Panel Poisson Regressions – Count Variables (+). 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  wci  Assassinations 
General 
Strikes 
Riots Revolutions  Demonstrations 
            
(Exp/Y)  –0.034*** –0.139*** 0.019  –0.042*** –0.048** –0.006*** 
  (–109.30) (–7.30)  (0.99)  (–2.76) (–1.97)  (–3.80) 
            
(logY)  –0.0077*** –0.0018  0.0022  –0.0230*** –0.0152** –0.0141*** 
  (–81.82) (–0.27) (0.39)  (–5.07) (–2.23)  (–2.96) 
No. Observ.  473  463  473  463  425  463 
(+) t statistics in parentheses. (*) p < 0.10, (**) p < 0.05, (***) p < 0.01. 
 
Table 7 presents the results. The significance of the main results is not 
affected. wci, the aggregate measure proposed by Banks, shows a strongly negative 
and significant effect under Poisson, as does every other variable – with the 
exception of general strikes. This last measure of unrest was also not significant 
under panel OLS (Table 3). Overall, there is no evidence that violations of the 
normality assumption might have been driving the significance of results.  
Asymmetry between budget cuts and increases 
So far, the regression analysis implicitly assumed that the effect of changes 
in expenditure on unrest does not depend on the sign of the change – cutting 
expenditure will increase unrest as much as a rise in spending will cut it. This is not 
an obvious assumption. It is a well-known finding in behavioral economics that 
humans tend to react more strongly to losses than to gains (Kahnemann and 
Tversky, 1991). To examine this issue further, I run separate regressions for the 
part of the distribution of expenditure changes that is greater or smaller than zero.  
 
Table 8 gives the results. The coefficient on expenditure changes is negative 
for both the positive and negative part of the distribution – but the effect is much 
more pronounced for expenditure cuts. For the aggregate indicator of instability 
from the Banks dataset, the coefficient for cuts is approximately 12 times larger 
than for expenditure increases. For chaos, it is 6 times bigger. Also, the negative 
coefficient for expenditure increases is not significant, while the coefficient for cuts is 
in both cases (strongly so for chaos). While this finding is not direct confirmation of 
gain-loss asymmetry, it is compatible with such an interpretation. 
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Table 8. Responses of Instability to Budget Cuts and Increases (+). 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  wci wci  chaos  chaos 
(Exp/Y)>0  –12.03   –0.0495   
  (–0.20)  (–1.02)  
      
(logY)  –15.21 –15.56  –0.0463*** –0.0201 
  (–1.30) (–1.02) (–2.86) (–0.92) 
      
(Exp/Y) ≤0   –148.8*  –0.311** 
   (–1.89)  (–2.46) 
      
Constant  1,869.4*** 1,798.7*** 2.108*** 1.645*** 
  (9.58) (7.67) (9.16) (4.68) 
No. Observ.  231  242  231  242 
(+) t statistics in parentheses. (*) p < 0.10, (**) p < 0.05, (***) p < 0.01. 
Interpretation – the timing of protest 
Paldam (1995), using weekly data, finds that protests peak while budget 
measures are discussed, and decline after budget adjustments are implemented. The 
data in this study is yearly, and cannot speak to the precise timing of protests. 
Assuming that Paldam’s finding holds more generally, this would suggest the 
following interpretation of the main results of this study: Budget cuts are still 
closely related with social unrest. However, instability would not be a consequence of 
popular outrage after the effects of adjustments make themselves felt; rather, riots, 
strikes and the like are a form of bargaining between different social parties over the 
cost of adjustment. Once the decisions are taken and implemented, unrest then 
declines.  
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
Social unrest can be powerful in undermining the credibility of governments. 
Street protests and violent demonstrations can force political leaders from office, as 
happened in the case of the de la Rúa government in Argentina in 2001. Riots, 
antigovernment demonstrations, general strikes and political assassinations are 
driven by a multitude of factors, many of them specific to the country in question. 
And yet, casual empiricism suggests that a significant amount of social unrest can 
be explained by economic factors.  
 
In this paper, I examine the effect of budget cuts on social unrest in Latin 
America for the period 1937-95, using a variety of indicators. There is clear evidence 
that reductions in spending clearly and strongly increase the risk of unrest. While 
the share of strikes, assassinations, riots and demonstrations that can be explained 
by budget cuts is not very high, the relationship is robust for countries with both 
democratic and autocratic structures. All indicators of unrest except general strikes 
are significantly and negatively associated with government expenditure. There is 
some evidence that the effect of budget cuts in times of inflation is particularly 
pronounced, and that ‘normal times’ without rapid price increases only see a mild 
association between austerity and anarchy. Constraints on the executive do not 
matter for the strength of the link, but a regime’s durability – the length of time  
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since the last significant changes in its political fabric – does: countries with a longer 
history of stability show a much weaker link between budget cuts and chaos. There 
is also clear evidence for a discontinuous increase in the effect of budget cuts. 
Extreme movements in measures of unrest are more readily explained by austerity 
measures than relatively mild upticks in upheaval.    
 
Our results provide a rationale why governments often find it hard to cut 
expenditure. While unrest is a relatively low-probability event – even in our sample 
of South American countries over the last 70 years – there is a non-zero probability 
that austerity will fan the flames of discontent, leading to violent anti-government 
protests. It may also offer a perspective on why public indebtedness differs so much 
around the globe, and even amongst countries with relatively similar levels of 
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